The upshot of this discussion is that it shows that anyone who is committed to the dogma of the immaculate conception is also committed to the possibility, and, indeed, the actuality, of at least one causal time loop, but also that this is no reason to reject the dogma, since all of the major worries for causal time loops can be resolved in one way or another. I then consider several common philosophical objections to causal time loops, showing how each is either not a serious problem for causal time loops in general or is not a serious problem for the immaculate conception time loop in particular because of some particular features of that particular loop. In this paper I argue first that, even on an orthodox reading of this doctrine, the immaculate conception seems to result in a kind of (. The doctrine of the immaculate conception, which is a dogma binding on all Roman Catholics and also held by members of some other Christian denominations, holds that Mary the mother of Jesus Christ was conceived without the stain of original sin as a result of the redeeming effects of Christ’s later life, passion, death, and resurrection. Yet, this line of reasoning may still be of interest to those who maintain that causes determine the chances of their effects for it raises some unresolved questions about the nature of chance in causal loops. I argue that Mellor's line of reasoning is unwarranted since it is based on untenable premisses about the relation between chances and long-run frequencies in causal loops. I consider Mellor's argument and more generally the nature of chance in causal loops. And he argues that a consideration of these constraints demonstrates that causal loops are impossible. Hugh Mellor has maintained that arguments for the possibility of causal loops also overlook some constraints, which are related to the chances (single-case, objective probabilities) that causes give (. ![]() The usual reply is that such loops impose heavy consistency constraints on the nature of causal connections in them constraints that are overlooked by the impossibility arguments. ( shrink)Ī common line of argument for the impossibility of closed causal loops is that they would involve causal paradoxes. Hencecausal loops may be more likely in a world with beings like us, than in one without. I end by speculating thatthe tendency amongst physicists to avoid discussion of causal loops involving intentionalaction may have been unfortunate, since intentional action is an excellent way tonon-mysteriously bring about what otherwise would have been an unlikely coincidence. Just how coincidental a loop will be varies: some arereally quite ordinary, and some are incredibly unlikely. ) are neither logically nor physically impossible.The only possibly objectionable feature that all causal loops share is that coincidenceis required to explain them. I raisedoubts about whether there must be causal loops if reverse causation obtains but devote themajority of the paper to describing, and dispelling concerns about, various kinds ofcausal loop. What is objectionable about reverse causation? I diagnose that the trulyinteresting objections are to a further possibility: that of causal loops. ![]() But all the truly interesting ones concern the possibility of reversecausation. There have been many objections to the possibility oftime travel.
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